diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index 35124a4..84cb55a 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -2,6 +2,15 @@
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+### 추가
+- PHP / WordPress 룰팩 `scanner/rules/php-wordpress.yml` 추가 — 바이브 코딩·에이전시 산출물에 많은 PHP/WordPress 코드를 처음으로 커버합니다. 기존 내장 eval/SQL 룰은 `.js`/`.py` 확장자에만 적용되어 `.php` 파일은 사각지대였습니다. 6종 모두 `**/*.php` 경로로 스코프되며, 안전 코드(prepared statement, `$wpdb->prepare()`, 상수 include 등) 오탐 0을 테스트로 검증했습니다.
+  - `php-sql-concat` — `mysqli_query()`/`$wpdb->query()` 등에 `$_GET`/`$_POST`/`$_REQUEST`/`$_COOKIE`를 직접 연결·보간(SQL 주입, CWE-89). CRITICAL.
+  - `php-unserialize-user-input` — 요청 입력을 `unserialize()`(PHP object injection, CWE-502). CRITICAL.
+  - `php-include-user-input` — 요청 입력 기반 `include`/`require`(LFI/RFI, CWE-98). CRITICAL.
+  - `php-exec-user-input` — 요청 입력이 들어간 `exec`/`system`/`shell_exec`/`passthru`(OS 명령 주입, CWE-78). CRITICAL.
+  - `php-eval-usage` — PHP `eval()` 사용(CWE-95). HIGH.
+  - `wordpress-debug-enabled` — `WP_DEBUG` true(프로덕션 정보 노출, CWE-489). WARNING.
+
 ### 추가
 - `appguardrail fix` 명령 — 안전하고 결정적인 자동 수정을 적용합니다(기본 dry-run diff, `--apply`로 기록). 의미를 바꾸지 않는 순수 additive 변환만 수행하며, 첫 변환으로 외부 `target="_blank"` 링크에 `rel="noopener noreferrer"`를 추가합니다(reverse tabnabbing 방지). 동작을 바꾸는 수정(시크릿→env 등)은 위험하므로 자동 적용하지 않고 fix-pack 프롬프트로 남깁니다. scan→fix→verify 루프를 안전하게 닫습니다.
 
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 920c539..e825110 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ Detects:
 - Trivy-backed dependency vulnerabilities, secrets, and misconfigurations
 - Bandit/Ruff/Semgrep/ZAP findings when their optional external engines are available
 - Dangerous Supabase/Firebase usage patterns
+- PHP/WordPress risks (SQL concatenation with superglobals, `unserialize()`/`include`/shell-exec on request input, `eval()`, `WP_DEBUG` enabled)
 - API routes missing authentication
 - Public Firebase rules (`read/write: true`)
 - Dangerous CORS settings (`origin: "*"`)
diff --git a/scanner/rules/php-wordpress.yml b/scanner/rules/php-wordpress.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf1f512
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scanner/rules/php-wordpress.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+rules:
+  # PHP / WordPress rule pack. The built-in dangerous-eval and
+  # sql-injection-risk rules only cover .js/.ts/.py extensions, so plain PHP
+  # and WordPress (plugin/theme/wp-config) code had no coverage before this
+  # pack. Every rule here is path-scoped to *.php files.
+  - id: php-eval-usage
+    patterns:
+      - pattern-regex: '\beval\s*\('
+    message: |
+      Use of eval() detected in PHP code. eval() executes arbitrary PHP and is
+      a common remote-code-execution vector, especially when any part of the
+      argument is user-controlled. Replace it with explicit logic (call_user_func
+      against an allowlist, json_decode for data, etc.).
+    severity: HIGH
+    languages: [generic]
+    cwe: [CWE-95]
+    owasp: [A03:2021]
+    paths:
+      include:
+        - "**/*.php"
+
+  - id: php-sql-concat
+    patterns:
+      - pattern-regex: '(?i)(?:\bmysqli_query|->\s*(?:query|get_results|get_row|get_var|get_col))\s*\((?:(?!prepare)[^;]){0,300}?\$_(?:GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE)\b'
+    message: |
+      SQL query built directly from request input ($_GET/$_POST/$_REQUEST/$_COOKIE)
+      detected. Concatenating or interpolating superglobals into mysqli_query()
+      or $wpdb->query()/get_results() is SQL injection. Use parameterized
+      queries: mysqli/PDO prepared statements, or $wpdb->prepare() in WordPress.
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    languages: [generic]
+    cwe: [CWE-89]
+    owasp: [A03:2021]
+    paths:
+      include:
+        - "**/*.php"
+
+  - id: php-unserialize-user-input
+    patterns:
+      - pattern-regex: 'unserialize\s*\(\s*(?:base64_decode\s*\(\s*)?\$_(?:GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE)\b'
+    message: |
+      unserialize() called on request input. PHP object injection lets an
+      attacker instantiate arbitrary classes and chain magic methods
+      (__wakeup/__destruct) into remote code execution. Use json_decode() for
+      data interchange, or pass ['allowed_classes' => false] at minimum.
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    languages: [generic]
+    cwe: [CWE-502]
+    owasp: [A08:2021]
+    paths:
+      include:
+        - "**/*.php"
+
+  - id: php-include-user-input
+    patterns:
+      - pattern-regex: '\b(?:include|require)(?:_once)?\s*\(?\s*(?:[\x27"][^\x27"\n]{0,80}[\x27"]\s*\.\s*)?\$_(?:GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE)\b'
+    message: |
+      include/require driven by request input detected. This is Local/Remote
+      File Inclusion: an attacker can load arbitrary files (../../wp-config.php)
+      or remote code. Map the request parameter to an allowlist of known page
+      names instead of passing it to include.
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    languages: [generic]
+    cwe: [CWE-98]
+    owasp: [A03:2021]
+    paths:
+      include:
+        - "**/*.php"
+
+  - id: php-exec-user-input
+    patterns:
+      - pattern-regex: '\b(?:exec|system|shell_exec|passthru|popen|proc_open)\s*\(\s*[^;)]{0,160}?\$_(?:GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE)\b'
+    message: |
+      Shell execution built from request input detected. Passing
+      $_GET/$_POST/$_REQUEST/$_COOKIE into exec()/system()/shell_exec()/passthru()
+      is OS command injection. Avoid shelling out; if unavoidable, validate
+      against a strict allowlist and wrap each argument in escapeshellarg().
+    severity: CRITICAL
+    languages: [generic]
+    cwe: [CWE-78]
+    owasp: [A03:2021]
+    paths:
+      include:
+        - "**/*.php"
+
+  - id: wordpress-debug-enabled
+    patterns:
+      - pattern-regex: 'define\s*\(\s*[\x27"]WP_DEBUG[\x27"]\s*,\s*true'
+    message: |
+      WP_DEBUG is enabled. In production this prints PHP errors (paths, queries,
+      stack traces) to visitors and aids attackers. Set WP_DEBUG to false in
+      production, or pair it with WP_DEBUG_DISPLAY false and WP_DEBUG_LOG true
+      so errors go to a log instead of the page.
+    severity: WARNING
+    languages: [generic]
+    cwe: [CWE-489]
+    owasp: [A05:2021]
+    paths:
+      include:
+        - "**/*.php"
diff --git a/tests/test_php_wordpress_rules.py b/tests/test_php_wordpress_rules.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32ce2c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_php_wordpress_rules.py
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+"""Coverage tests for the PHP / WordPress rule pack (scanner/rules/php-wordpress.yml)."""
+
+from scanner.cli.appguardrail import SCAN_RULES, _scan_file
+
+PHP_RULE_IDS = [
+    "php-eval-usage",
+    "php-sql-concat",
+    "php-unserialize-user-input",
+    "php-include-user-input",
+    "php-exec-user-input",
+    "wordpress-debug-enabled",
+]
+
+_BY_ID = {}
+for _r in SCAN_RULES:
+    _BY_ID.setdefault(_r["id"], _r)
+
+
+def _rule(rule_id):
+    assert rule_id in _BY_ID, f"rule not loaded: {rule_id}"
+    return _BY_ID[rule_id]
+
+
+def test_php_rules_loaded_and_scoped_to_php_files():
+    for rule_id in PHP_RULE_IDS:
+        rule = _rule(rule_id)
+        assert rule["include_paths"] == ["**/*.php"], rule_id
+        # generic language: no extension filter, path glob does the scoping
+        assert rule["extensions"] is None, rule_id
+
+
+def test_php_eval_usage():
+    r = _rule("php-eval-usage")
+    assert r["severity"] == "HIGH"
+    assert r["pattern"].search("eval($_GET['code']);")
+    assert r["pattern"].search("eval ( base64_decode($payload) );")
+    # similarly named functions must not match
+    assert not r["pattern"].search("$score = evaluate($input);")
+    assert not r["pattern"].search("$mode = 'eval';")
+
+
+def test_php_sql_concat():
+    r = _rule("php-sql-concat")
+    assert r["severity"] == "CRITICAL"
+    assert r["pattern"].search(
+        'mysqli_query($conn, "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " . $_GET[\'id\']);'
+    )
+    assert r["pattern"].search('$wpdb->query("DELETE FROM wp_posts WHERE ID = $_POST[id]");')
+    assert r["pattern"].search('$wpdb->get_results("SELECT * FROM t WHERE a = $_REQUEST[a]");')
+    # parameterized queries must not match
+    assert not r["pattern"].search(
+        'mysqli_query($conn, "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?");'
+    )
+    assert not r["pattern"].search(
+        '$wpdb->query($wpdb->prepare("SELECT * FROM t WHERE id = %d", $_GET[\'id\']));'
+    )
+    assert not r["pattern"].search('$wpdb->query($sql);')
+
+
+def test_php_unserialize_user_input():
+    r = _rule("php-unserialize-user-input")
+    assert r["severity"] == "CRITICAL"
+    assert r["pattern"].search("$obj = unserialize($_COOKIE['session']);")
+    assert r["pattern"].search("unserialize(base64_decode($_POST['data']))")
+    # safe decoding of request input must not match
+    assert not r["pattern"].search("$data = json_decode($_POST['payload'], true);")
+    assert not r["pattern"].search("$obj = unserialize($trusted_cache_blob);")
+
+
+def test_php_include_user_input():
+    r = _rule("php-include-user-input")
+    assert r["severity"] == "CRITICAL"
+    assert r["pattern"].search("include($_GET['page']);")
+    assert r["pattern"].search("require_once 'pages/' . $_REQUEST['p'];")
+    assert r["pattern"].search("include_once $_POST['template'];")
+    # constant/allowlisted includes must not match
+    assert not r["pattern"].search("include __DIR__ . '/header.php';")
+    assert not r["pattern"].search("require_once ABSPATH . 'wp-settings.php';")
+
+
+def test_php_exec_user_input():
+    r = _rule("php-exec-user-input")
+    assert r["severity"] == "CRITICAL"
+    assert r["pattern"].search('system("ping " . $_GET[\'host\']);')
+    assert r["pattern"].search("exec($_POST['cmd'], $output);")
+    assert r["pattern"].search('shell_exec("convert $_REQUEST[file] out.png");')
+    # fixed commands and escaped args without superglobals must not match
+    assert not r["pattern"].search("system('ls -la /var/www');")
+    assert not r["pattern"].search("exec('git pull', $output);")
+
+
+def test_wordpress_debug_enabled():
+    r = _rule("wordpress-debug-enabled")
+    assert r["severity"] == "WARNING"
+    assert r["pattern"].search("define( 'WP_DEBUG', true );")
+    assert r["pattern"].search('define("WP_DEBUG",true);')
+    assert not r["pattern"].search("define( 'WP_DEBUG', false );")
+    assert not r["pattern"].search("define( 'WP_DEBUG_LOG', true );")
+
+
+def test_php_rules_fire_end_to_end_on_php_paths_only(tmp_path):
+    plugin = tmp_path / "wp-content" / "plugins" / "demo" / "page.php"
+    plugin.parent.mkdir(parents=True)
+    plugin.write_text(
+        "<?php\n"
+        "eval($_GET['code']);\n"
+        "$wpdb->query(\"DELETE FROM wp_posts WHERE ID = $_POST[id]\");\n"
+        "$obj = unserialize($_COOKIE['session']);\n"
+        "include($_GET['page']);\n"
+        "system(\"ping \" . $_GET['host']);\n"
+    )
+    config = tmp_path / "wp-config.php"
+    config.write_text("<?php\ndefine( 'WP_DEBUG', true );\n")
+
+    findings = _scan_file(plugin, tmp_path) + _scan_file(config, tmp_path)
+    fired = {f["rule_id"] for f in findings}
+    assert set(PHP_RULE_IDS) <= fired
+
+    # the same code in a non-PHP file must not trigger the pack
+    script = tmp_path / "app.js"
+    script.write_text("eval($_GET['code']);\n")
+    js_fired = {
+        f["rule_id"]
+        for f in _scan_file(script, tmp_path)
+        if f["rule_id"] in PHP_RULE_IDS
+    }
+    assert js_fired == set()