diff --git a/eval/lib/pixel_query.py b/eval/lib/pixel_query.py
index c28c0716..11103974 100644
--- a/eval/lib/pixel_query.py
+++ b/eval/lib/pixel_query.py
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 
 import logging
 import os
+import pathlib
 from PIL import Image, ImageDraw, ImageFont
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -118,7 +119,8 @@ def render(self, example_id: str, query_text: str) -> str:
 
         If the image already exists on disk it is *not* re-rendered.
         """
-        out_path = os.path.join(self.output_dir, f"{example_id}_query.png")
+        safe_id = pathlib.Path(example_id).name
+        out_path = os.path.join(self.output_dir, f"{safe_id}_query.png")
         if os.path.exists(out_path):
             return out_path
 
@@ -270,7 +272,8 @@ def render(
         Returns:
             Path to the saved PNG.
         """
-        out_path = os.path.join(self.output_dir, f"{example_id}_query_card.png")
+        safe_id = pathlib.Path(example_id).name
+        out_path = os.path.join(self.output_dir, f"{safe_id}_query_card.png")
         if os.path.exists(out_path) and not force:
             return out_path
 
diff --git a/tests/test_pixel_query_path_traversal.py b/tests/test_pixel_query_path_traversal.py
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..36136069
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_pixel_query_path_traversal.py
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+"""Path-traversal hardening tests for eval/lib/pixel_query.py (issues #78, #79).
+
+Tests the sanitization logic directly — verifying that pathlib.Path(x).name
+strips traversal sequences from example_id before it reaches os.path.join.
+Does NOT require a TTF font or actual rendering.
+"""
+
+import os
+import pathlib
+
+import pytest
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "example_id,expected_stem",
+    [
+        ("normal_id", "normal_id"),
+        ("../../etc/passwd", "passwd"),
+        ("../evil", "evil"),
+        ("foo/bar/baz", "baz"),
+        ("/absolute/path/id", "id"),
+        ("..%2F..%2Fetc/passwd", "passwd"),  # URL-encoded separators still have /
+        ("....//....//etc/shadow", "shadow"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_safe_id_strips_traversal(example_id, expected_stem):
+    """pathlib.Path(x).name must strip all directory components."""
+    safe_id = pathlib.Path(example_id).name
+    assert safe_id == expected_stem
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "example_id",
+    [
+        "../../etc/passwd",
+        "../evil",
+        "foo/bar/baz",
+        "/absolute/path/id",
+        "..\\..\\windows\\system32",
+    ],
+)
+def test_constructed_path_stays_in_output_dir(tmp_path, example_id):
+    """os.path.join with sanitized id must never escape output_dir."""
+    output_dir = str(tmp_path)
+    safe_id = pathlib.Path(example_id).name
+    out_path = os.path.join(output_dir, f"{safe_id}_query.png")
+
+    # Resolve and check containment
+    resolved = pathlib.Path(out_path).resolve()
+    assert str(resolved).startswith(str(tmp_path.resolve()))
+
+
+def test_traversal_does_not_reach_parent(tmp_path):
+    """Even deeply nested traversal must not escape."""
+    evil_ids = [
+        "../" * 10 + "etc/passwd",
+        "..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\config",
+    ]
+    for example_id in evil_ids:
+        safe_id = pathlib.Path(example_id).name
+        out_path = os.path.join(str(tmp_path), f"{safe_id}_query.png")
+        resolved = pathlib.Path(out_path).resolve()
+        assert str(resolved).startswith(str(tmp_path.resolve())), (
+            f"{example_id!r} escaped to {resolved}"
+        )