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+# ADR-155: MCP Tool Permission Attestation (Min-Privilege Contract)
+
+- **Status**: Proposed
+- **Authors**: claude (dream-cycle agent, 2026-06-26)
+- **Date**: 2026-06-26
+- **Dream Cycle Issue**: TBD (filed same night)
+
+---
+
+## Context
+
+The 2026-06-26 Dream Cycle SOTA sweep surfaced two converging evidence streams that identify MCP tool-call boundaries as the primary unguarded attack surface in LLM agent systems:
+
+1. **ShareLock (arXiv 2026, Grade A)** — Achieves >90% poisoning ASR on MCP-connected agents via Shamir's threshold scheme distributed across multiple benign-looking tool servers. The attack exploits the absence of tool-level permission declarations: any server can inject arbitrary behaviour if the agent does not enforce a privilege contract at dispatch time.
+
+2. **ToolPrivBench (arXiv 2026, Grade A)** — 64.9% of Qwen3-8B tool calls escalate to higher-privilege tools than the task requires (OPUR metric). Post-training with privilege-aware objectives reduces OPUR to 27.02%. The benchmark formalises 544 scenarios across 8 domains and 5 risk patterns.
+
+3. **ControlPlane paper (arXiv 2026, Grade A)** — Fewer than 1% of coding agents declare explicit permission boundaries, making over-privilege the default posture.
+
+Ruflo's current security module (`@claude-flow/security`) provides `SafeExecutor` (command injection), `InputValidator` (Zod), and `PathValidator` (traversal). None operate at the MCP tool registration or dispatch layer. Tool calls are forwarded without a declared min-privilege contract.
+
+---
+
+## Decision
+
+Introduce a **MCP Tool Permission Attestation** layer with two integration points:
+
+### 1. Tool Registration Contract
+
+Every MCP tool registration (server-side and client-side stub) must carry a `permissions` manifest:
+
+```typescript
+interface ToolPermissionContract {
+  toolName: string;
+  minPrivilege: {
+    filesystem?: 'none' | 'read' | 'write' | 'execute';
+    network?: 'none' | 'outbound' | 'inbound' | 'full';
+    process?: 'none' | 'spawn' | 'kill';
+    memory?: 'none' | 'read' | 'write';
+    agentScope?: 'none' | 'self' | 'team' | 'global';
+  };
+  declaredAt: string;   // ISO date of contract signature
+  trustLevel: 'official' | 'community' | 'unverified';
+}
+```
+
+Tools without a `permissions` field are assigned `trustLevel: 'unverified'` and routed through a stricter sandbox.
+
+### 2. Dispatch-Time Enforcement
+
+`SafeExecutor` is extended with a `McpPermissionGuard` that runs before every tool dispatch:
+
+```
+Request → McpPermissionGuard → {
+  if call.escalatesAbove(tool.minPrivilege) → REJECT (log + alert)
+  if tool.trustLevel === 'unverified' && call.privilege > 'read' → BLOCK
+  else → forward to SafeExecutor → execute
+}
+```
+
+Rejection emits a structured event to the security audit log; repeated escalation triggers a circuit-breaker (ADR-097 pattern).
+
+---
+
+## Target Metrics
+
+| Metric | Baseline | Target |
+|--------|----------|--------|
+| OPUR (over-privilege usage rate) | ~64.9% (ToolPrivBench Qwen3-8B baseline) | ≤ 30% |
+| ShareLock-style poisoning ASR | >90% (no defence) | < 10% |
+| Tools with declared contracts | 0% | 100% of official tools; ≥ 80% of community tools |
+
+---
+
+## Consequences
+
+**Positive:**
+- Closes the primary attack vector identified by ShareLock
+- Provides a measurable ToolPrivBench-equivalent baseline for continuous monitoring
+- Composable with ADR-093 (MCP audit) and ADR-131 (tool output guardrail)
+
+**Negative / Risk:**
+- Breaking change for tool servers that currently omit `permissions` — requires migration period
+- OPUR measurement requires a ToolPrivBench-compatible evaluation harness (new test infrastructure)
+- Unverified tools silently downgraded to read-only scope — may surprise plugin authors
+
+## Alternatives Considered
+
+- **Prompt-level privilege hints only** (rejected): Relies on model compliance; ToolPrivBench shows models ignore prompts under tool-failure pressure
+- **Runtime syscall tracing** (deferred): Effective but requires platform-specific instrumentation; out of scope for v3.7 timeframe
+- **Output-only guardrail** (existing ADR-131/146): Insufficient — output sanitisation does not prevent the upstream tool invocation
+
+## References
+
+- ShareLock: arXiv 2026 (MCP threshold poisoning, >90% ASR)
+- ToolPrivBench: arXiv 2026 (64.9% OPUR baseline, 27.02% post-training)
+- ControlPlane: arXiv 2026 (<1% agents declare permission boundaries)
+- ADR-092: MCP tool validation bugfixes
+- ADR-093: MCP audit May 2026 remediation
+- ADR-097: Federation budget circuit-breaker (reused pattern)
+- ADR-131/146: Tool output guardrail
diff --git a/v3/docs/adr/README.md b/v3/docs/adr/README.md
index 0d2f7985a06..4ab7b872a9a 100644
--- a/v3/docs/adr/README.md
+++ b/v3/docs/adr/README.md
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ All ADRs are located in [`/v3/implementation/adrs/`](../../implementation/adrs/)
 | [ADR-020](../../implementation/adrs/ADR-020-headless-worker-integration.md) | Headless Worker Integration | Complete |
 | [ADR-046](../../implementation/adrs/ADR-046-ruflo-rebrand.md) | Dual Umbrella: claude-flow + ruflo | Accepted |
 | [ADR-047](../../implementation/adrs/ADR-047-fast-mode-integration.md) | Fast Mode Integration | Proposed |
+| [ADR-155](ADR-155-mcp-tool-permission-attestation.md) | MCP Tool Permission Attestation (Min-Privilege Contract) | Proposed |
 
 ## Summary Documents
 
diff --git a/v3/docs/dream-cycle/2026-06-26-security-sota.md b/v3/docs/dream-cycle/2026-06-26-security-sota.md
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+# Security SOTA Report — 2026-06-26
+
+**TL;DR**: MCP tool-call boundaries are the critical unguarded attack surface in 2026 — ShareLock achieves >90% poisoning ASR via threshold schemes while fewer than 1% of agents declare permission contracts; Ruflo's SafeExecutor has no MCP-layer attestation.
+
+## What's New in 2026
+
+| Finding | Source | Confidence |
+|---------|--------|------------|
+| ShareLock threshold poisoning on MCP tools — >90% ASR via Shamir's scheme distributed across benign-looking servers | arXiv 2026 | A |
+| ToolPrivBench: 64.9% over-privilege rate (Qwen3-8B); post-training drops to 27.02% | arXiv / ToolPrivBench benchmark | A |
+| Entropy-dynamics jailbreak detection — AUROC 0.941, training-free, peaks at 50–85% layer depth | arXiv 2026 | A |
+| Progent prompt-injection defense: 25.8% → 4.2% ASR (6× reduction) on open-weight agents | arXiv 2026 | A |
+| Unified intent+harm verification: F1 0.90 → 0.95, residual ASR 4.1% | arXiv 2026 | A |
+| PrivacyAlign: GPT-5.5 23.3% leakage, Claude Opus 4.7 34.1%, Gemini 3.1 Pro 41.4% baseline | HuggingFace paper 2026 | B (vendor-aligned claim) |
+| TerraProbe: 71.4% of LLM repair suggestions are deceptive (pass shallow, fail deep validation) | arXiv 2026 | A |
+| LangSmith gateway guard: configurable PII + timeout policies + sandbox auth proxy (GCP/AWS) | LangChain changelog June 2026 | B |
+| <1% of coding agents declare explicit permission boundaries (ControlPlane paper) | arXiv 2026 | A |
+
+## Ruflo Current Capability
+
+| Capability | Status | Location |
+|-----------|--------|----------|
+| Input validation (Zod-based) | ✅ Implemented | `@claude-flow/security` InputValidator |
+| Path traversal prevention | ✅ Implemented | PathValidator |
+| Command injection protection | ✅ Implemented | SafeExecutor |
+| Password hashing (bcrypt) | ✅ Implemented | PasswordHasher |
+| MCP tool-call permission attestation | ❌ Missing | No declared boundary per tool |
+| Over-privilege detection at tool dispatch | ❌ Missing | No ToolPrivBench-equivalent |
+| Jailbreak detection (entropy layer) | ❌ Missing | No inference-time guard |
+| Prompt injection defense (Progent-style) | ❌ Missing | No out-of-band verification |
+| Privacy leakage measurement | ❌ Missing | No contextual privacy alignment |
+
+## Competitor Comparison
+
+| Competitor | MCP Security | Prompt Injection Defense | Sandbox / Isolation | Over-Privilege Guard |
+|-----------|-------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
+| **LangChain / LangSmith** | Not applicable (custom tool registry) | Gateway guard PII filter (B-grade claim) | Sandbox auth proxy (GCP/AWS/Git) June 2026 | Not published |
+| **AutoGen** | No public MCP security posture | Research-stage (no product feature) | Docker isolation (configurable) | No published benchmark |
+| **CrewAI** | No public MCP security posture | Not documented | Environment sandboxing | Not published |
+| **OpenAI Swarm** | N/A (API-native) | System prompt hardening only | Operator-level isolation | No over-privilege API |
+| **Ruflo** | SafeExecutor (no MCP-layer) | None implemented | Agent process isolation | None |
+
+## Benchmarks
+
+| Benchmark | Result | Grade | Source |
+|-----------|--------|-------|--------|
+| ShareLock MCP poisoning ASR | >90% | A | arXiv 2026 |
+| ToolPrivBench OPUR (Qwen3-8B baseline) | 64.9% | A | arXiv ToolPrivBench 2026 |
+| ToolPrivBench OPUR post-training | 27.02% | A | arXiv ToolPrivBench 2026 |
+| Progent ASR reduction | 25.8% → 4.2% | A | arXiv 2026 |
+| Entropy jailbreak AUROC | 0.941 | A | arXiv 2026 |
+| Intent+harm F1 (pre/post) | 0.90 → 0.95 | A | arXiv 2026 |
+| TerraProbe deceptive-fix rate | 71.4% | A | arXiv 2026 |
+
+All 7 claims are Grade A (reproducible 2026 papers with numeric benchmarks).
+
+## SOTA Proof & Witness
+
+- **Session commit**: 8ae87524553569dcd6ba6a7e7e96fbea6b0e0b74
+- **Report SHA-256**: 90fdca347b95cb2331628df553ffc9e620e877f4c2c7d14f4c790af1f4c4756b
+- **Witness stamp**: 94640412feecef6ccef028cece6fb8af1abb8d577c12c850fd9f0a979a969cfc
+- **Verifier**: `cat dream-gist-2026-06-26.md | sha256sum` → concat with session commit → `sha256sum` → must equal witness stamp
+
+## Scan Findings — Intelligence
+
+**Finding**: Plan representations decay 4.1×–12.4× after a single execution step (Snowflake / HuggingFace 2026). Context eviction reduces task success 56.7% → 22.0% (−34.7 pp). SONA's adaptation loop has no plan-persistence guard — plans stored in short-context memory evict silently.
+
+**Source**: "Plans Don't Persist: Why Context Management Is Load Bearing for LLM Agents" (Snowflake, 2026).  
+**Competitive signal**: DeepSeek-R1 partially mitigates via internal re-derivation; early-warning probe detects decay 4.45 steps ahead at 74.2% accuracy.
+
+## Scan Findings — Swarm
+
+**Finding**: SPIN framework reduces multi-agent policy coordination from O(n^m) to O(m·n·χ²) — exponential to linear/polynomial — enabling stable decentralized subgroup formation without central coordinator.
+
+**Source**: arXiv 2606.07557, Fan 2026.  
+**Competitive signal**: Hardware-embodied swarms (hexapod locomotion, SIES framework) validating real-time recovery; decentralized scaling is the recognized bottleneck. Ruflo's hierarchical-default topology is suboptimal for large-fleet decentralized scenarios.
+
+## Recommended Next Steps
+
+1. **Implement MCP Tool Permission Attestation** (ADR proposed tonight): Each MCP tool registration must declare a `min-privilege` contract (read/write/execute/network scope); SafeExecutor rejects calls that escalate beyond declared boundary before dispatch. Target: reduce OPUR below 30% (matching ToolPrivBench post-training baseline). File as ADR-[NEXT].
+
+2. **Add Progent-style prompt-injection out-of-band verifier**: Intercept agent tool-call requests and run a secondary lightweight model (Haiku, Tier 2) to verify intent before execution. Benchmark against Progent's 4.2% residual ASR. Estimated token overhead: ~15% per tool call.
+
+3. **Entropy-dynamics jailbreak guard on SONA input boundary**: At the MoE gate (inference time), compute layer-entropy trajectory (Kendall τ) on the routing distribution; flag if monotonicity score exceeds threshold (AUROC 0.941 reference). This is training-free and composable with existing RuVector intelligence pipeline.