deny.toml

# cargo-deny configuration — Rung 1 policy gate.
#
# Run locally with: cargo deny check
# See docs/formalisation-roadmap.md for the assurance-ladder context.

[graph]
# Consider the full dependency tree, including the `mcp` feature (rmcp, tokio,
# schemars), so the license/advisory checks match what clippy/test build with
# --all-features.
all-features = true

[advisories]
# RustSec advisory database. Vulnerabilities and yanked crates fail the build;
# this overlaps deliberately with the separate `cargo audit` job (the backlog
# names both — deny is the policy gate, audit is the focused advisory check).
yanked = "deny"
ignore = [
    # RUSTSEC-2026-0189: DNS rebinding in rmcp's Streamable HTTP server
    # transport (missing Host-header validation). Not exploitable here: the
    # advisory explicitly excludes non-HTTP transports ("stdio and
    # child-process transports are not affected"), and sudo-proxy enables only
    # rmcp's `transport-io` feature (Cargo.toml) and serves over stdio
    # (src/bin/sudo-proxy-mcp.rs: `.serve(stdio())`). The vulnerable HTTP
    # server transport is not compiled in. Mirrored in the `cargo audit` step
    # (.github/workflows/ci.yml). Revisit if an HTTP transport is ever added.
    "RUSTSEC-2026-0189",
]

[bans]
# Duplicate versions are noise to track, not a hard failure (yet).
multiple-versions = "warn"
wildcards = "deny"

[licenses]
# Allowlist, reconciled against the full dependency tree (all-features) with
# `cargo deny list`. Kept tight on purpose: a new dependency carrying a license
# not listed here fails the check and forces a review — that is the gate.
# (r-efi's LGPL-2.1-or-later and memchr's Unlicense are OR-expressions
# satisfied by Apache-2.0 / MIT, so neither copyleft license is allowed here.)
allow = [
    "MIT",
    "Apache-2.0",
    "Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception",
    "Unicode-3.0",
]
confidence-threshold = 0.8

[sources]
# Only crates.io is trusted; an unknown registry or git source fails the build.
unknown-registry = "deny"
unknown-git = "deny"