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docs: Define supported threat model - #227
BenWestgate wants to merge 2 commits into
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This is not clear and concise enough. I didn't fully review it.
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Replaced the long general threat-model document with a concise installer-specific model, and based it on the claim-bounding branch. It now identifies only CipherStick-controlled boundaries and explicitly separates inherited Tails, Bitcoin Core, hardware, and operational risks. |
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AI-generated review (Claude), posted at the maintainer's request.
ACK 67be0b9 (content). It needs the same rebase as #226.
- The boundaries are the right four, and the non-goals avoid restating upstream docs.
- The first line ("does not manage wallet keys") becomes false once #230 lands. Reconcile whichever merges second.
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This branch carried old copies of #202, #226 and #227. Take 212's tree and reapply only this PR's change: HANDOFF.md, the README handoff link, the copied-chainstate trust warning and the new FAQ handoff entry, fitted to #226's rewritten FAQ. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PjUU3NvvEE8SGD3RdpXWDr
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Codex current-head review at 3b531b5: no findings. The model cleanly separates CipherStick-owned installer/persistence/update boundaries from Tails, Bitcoin Core, hardware, and operator assumptions, and does not overclaim protection from an attacker who already controls unlocked Persistent Storage.
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AI-assisted current-head review, posted at the maintainer's request.
ACK e0c3744. The delivery-boundary comment is now addressed: the threat model explicitly says current repository clones are not authenticated and tracks signed-release work separately. Lint is green.
Describe only the trust boundaries introduced by the CipherStick installer and handoff guidance, then distinguish them from risks that remain the responsibility of Tails, Bitcoin Core, hardware, and the operator.\n\nFixes #212.
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AI-assisted current-head review: ACK c8b005a. The threat model distinguishes installer-owned boundaries from Tails/Core trust assumptions and states the current unauthenticated-clone limitation. No findings.
What
Define the installer-specific trust boundaries and distinguish them from upstream and operator risks.
Why
The threat model should say what CipherStick changes without restating Tails or Bitcoin Core documentation, or claiming it removes their residual risks.
Closes #212
Testing
git diff --check