🚨 [security] Update jsonwebtoken 8.5.1 → 9.0.3 (major)

[depfu]

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🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

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Here is everything you need to know about this upgrade. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ jsonwebtoken (8.5.1 → 9.0.3) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 jsonwebtoken's insecure implementation of key retrieval function could lead to Forgeable Public/Private Tokens from RSA to HMAC

Overview

Versions <=8.5.1 of jsonwebtoken library can be misconfigured so that passing a poorly implemented key retrieval function (referring to the secretOrPublicKey argument from the readme link) will result in incorrect verification of tokens. There is a possibility of using a different algorithm and key combination in verification than the one that was used to sign the tokens. Specifically, tokens signed with an asymmetric public key could be verified with a symmetric HS256 algorithm. This can lead to successful validation of forged tokens.

Am I affected?

You will be affected if your application is supporting usage of both symmetric key and asymmetric key in jwt.verify() implementation with the same key retrieval function.

How do I fix it?

Update to version 9.0.0.

Will the fix impact my users?

There is no impact for end users

🚨 jsonwebtoken vulnerable to signature validation bypass due to insecure default algorithm in jwt.verify()

Overview

In versions <=8.5.1 of jsonwebtoken library, lack of algorithm definition and a falsy secret or key in the jwt.verify() function can lead to signature validation bypass due to defaulting to the none algorithm for signature verification.

Am I affected?

You will be affected if all the following are true in the jwt.verify() function:

• a token with no signature is received
• no algorithms are specified
• a falsy (e.g. null, false, undefined) secret or key is passed

How do I fix it?

Update to version 9.0.0 which removes the default support for the none algorithm in the jwt.verify() method.

Will the fix impact my users?

There will be no impact, if you update to version 9.0.0 and you don’t need to allow for the none algorithm. If you need 'none' algorithm, you have to explicitly specify that in jwt.verify() options.

🚨 jsonwebtoken unrestricted key type could lead to legacy keys usage

Overview

Versions <=8.5.1 of jsonwebtoken library could be misconfigured so that legacy, insecure key types are used for signature verification. For example, DSA keys could be used with the RS256 algorithm.

Am I affected?

You are affected if you are using an algorithm and a key type other than the combinations mentioned below

Key type	algorithm
ec	ES256, ES384, ES512
rsa	RS256, RS384, RS512, PS256, PS384, PS512
rsa-pss	PS256, PS384, PS512

And for Elliptic Curve algorithms:

alg	Curve
ES256	prime256v1
ES384	secp384r1
ES512	secp521r1

How do I fix it?

Update to version 9.0.0. This version validates for asymmetric key type and algorithm combinations. Please refer to the above mentioned algorithm / key type combinations for the valid secure configuration. After updating to version 9.0.0, If you still intend to continue with signing or verifying tokens using invalid key type/algorithm value combinations, you’ll need to set the allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes option to true in the sign() and/or verify() functions.

Will the fix impact my users?

There will be no impact, if you update to version 9.0.0 and you already use a valid secure combination of key type and algorithm. Otherwise, use the allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes option to true in the sign() and verify() functions to continue usage of invalid key type/algorithm combination in 9.0.0 for legacy compatibility.

Release Notes

9.0.3 (from changelog)

• updates jws version to 4.0.1.

9.0.2 (from changelog)

• security: updating semver to 7.5.4 to resolve CVE-2022-25883, closes #921.
• refactor: reduce library size by using lodash specific dependencies, closes #878.

9.0.1 (from changelog)

• fix(stubs): allow decode method to be stubbed

9.0.0 (from changelog)

Breaking changes: See Migration from v8 to v9

Breaking changes

• Removed support for Node versions 11 and below.
• The verify() function no longer accepts unsigned tokens by default. ([8345030]8345030)
• RSA key size must be 2048 bits or greater. ([ecdf6cc]ecdf6cc)
• Key types must be valid for the signing / verification algorithm

Security fixes

• security: fixes Arbitrary File Write via verify function - CVE-2022-23529
• security: fixes Insecure default algorithm in jwt.verify() could lead to signature validation bypass - CVE-2022-23540
• security: fixes Insecure implementation of key retrieval function could lead to Forgeable Public/Private Tokens from RSA to HMAC - CVE-2022-23541
• security: fixes Unrestricted key type could lead to legacy keys usage - CVE-2022-23539

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by 23 commits:

• chore: bump jws to 4.0.1 (#1007)
• Release 9.0.2 (#935)
• refactor: use specific lodash packages (#933)
• security: Updating semver to 7.5.4 to resolve CVE-2022-25883 (#932)
• Updating package version to 9.0.1 (#920)
• fix(stubs): allow decode method to be stubbed (#876)
• Merge pull request from GHSA-8cf7-32gw-wr33
• chore(ci): remove github test actions job (#861)
• chore(ci): configure Github Actions jobs for Tests & Security Scanning (#856)
• fix!: Prevent accidental use of insecure key sizes & misconfiguration of secrets (#852)
• fix(sign&verify)!: Remove default `none` support from `sign` and `verify` methods, and require it to be explicitly configured (#851)
• Upload OpsLevel YAML (#849)
• docs: update references vercel/ms references (#770)
• docs: document "invalid token" error
• docs: fix spelling in README.md: Peak -> Peek (#754)
• docs: make decode impossible to discover before verify
• refactor: make decode non-enumerable
• docs: add jwtid to options of jwt.verify (#704)
• Replace tilde-indexOf with includes (#647)
• Adds not to README on decoded payload validation (#646)
• docs: fix tiny style change in readme (#622)
• style: add missing semicolon (#641)
• ci: use circleci (#589)

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