Do not open a public issue for a security bug.
Email the maintainer at the address listed on the GitHub profile
(github.com/elcoosp) with:
- A minimal reproduction (source file or PR that demonstrates the bug),
- The compiler version (
glyim --version), - A description of the impact (crash, arbitrary code execution, data disclosure, denial of service, etc.),
- Whether the bug affects a compiled program at runtime, or the compiler itself while processing untrusted input.
You will receive an acknowledgement within ~7 days and a plan for the fix timeline.
The following are in scope as security bugs:
- Compiler-side memory safety — a
#[forbid(unsafe_code)]-style panic in the compiler driver while parsing, type-checking, lowering, or code-gen a hostile input. A crashed compiler with a controlled ICE is not a security issue; a compiler that reads out-of-bounds or executes arbitrary code is. - Silent miscompiles with security impact — a program that
compiles cleanly but produces wrong output in a way that a program
author would reasonably not notice (e.g. a bounds check silently
elided, a
dropnot run). - Runtime library issues (
glyim-runtime) — undefined behavior in a runtime primitive reachable from a safe program. - Supply chain — a malicious crate accepted by
glyipwithout checksum verification, or a registry compromise. (Checksum verification is implemented incrates/glyip/src/dep.rs'sverify_checksum; if you find a bypass, that is in scope.) - LSP / proc-macro isolation — a malicious proc-macro crate escaping its intended privilege boundary (currently: proc macros run as arbitrary Rust, so the boundary is "the user opted in to compiling with a proc-macro dependency").
- Undefined behavior that Rust itself would also exhibit —
unsafecode the user wrote is the user's responsibility. - Denial of service via a pathological input file — a file that takes N minutes to compile is a bug, but it is not a security vulnerability.
- Missing language features — the generated
KNOWN_GAPS.md(fromledger/gaps/known/*.toml) documents the 5 open gaps, each capped at a level the registry computes. A feature that rejects at compile time is not a security issue. - Frontend-only bugs — a parser panic on adversarial input is a robustness bug (reportable as an ordinary issue), not a security issue, unless it leads to memory unsafety or code execution.
We follow a 90-day coordinated disclosure window from acknowledgement, or shorter if a fix ships sooner. Credit will be given to the reporter unless requested otherwise.
- Compilation cache (
crates/glyim-db/src/cache.rs) — SHA-256 content-addressed; no path traversal (keys are hex strings;<root>/objects/<key>.o). - glyip lockfile checksums — implemented
(
verify_checksum); a missing checksum refuses the download rather than proceeding. - Proc macros — execute as arbitrary Rust. Users must
opt in to a proc-macro dependency explicitly
(
--proc-macro-deps); the isolation model is "the user asked for it". - LSP — the LSP server runs in the same process as the editor's LSP client; a hostile workspace is not a security boundary (matches rust-analyzer's model). Report crashes as ordinary bugs.