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Add Quark malware analysis report for BrasDex - #986

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@aiden00713 aiden00713 commented Oct 30, 2026 •

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BrasDex Malware Family Analysis Report

BrasDex is an Android banking malware reported by ThreatFabric on 2022-12-15. According to that report, it initially posed as Android settings applications while targeting Brazilian banking applications, and in its latest campaign it started posing as the Banco Santander BR banking application. The family label used here comes from the MalwareBazaar signature BrasDex, under which both analysed samples were collected. This report checks the samples against the 19 MITRE ATT&CK techniques listed for S0480 Cerberus, using Quark's existing rules. Check here for the rule set.

Quark's rule classification flagged 2 of 2 BrasDex samples as high-risk in this experiment (detection rate 100%). Benign-cohort false-positive rate was not measured here. See tested APKs below.

Identified Well-Known Threats

This section uses the technique list of the S0480 Cerberus software entry as its reference taxonomy; this does not mean BrasDex is Cerberus. Of the 19 techniques listed for S0480, 18 were mapped to at least one Quark rule and evaluated against the BrasDex samples, and 3 were confirmed by Quark behavior maps; the 3 listed below are shown as sections. See the coverage-gap notes at the end of this section for the other 16 techniques.

MITRE Technique Real-world manifestation
T1430 Location Tracking Reading the device's last known location through the Android location API
T1516 Input Injection Performing accessibility actions on UI nodes found by view ID or in the active window
T1628.001 Suppress Application Icon Hiding the app's icon from the launcher

The behavior maps below come from two samples: the T1430 map from 3b66805144a14cb00bb58f41690e529c9e75b265faecbdb594c6c9f0f74892ed.apk (package com.ourselves.resort), and the T1516 and T1628.001 maps from b14412435de7ebe13c434eef79a5c24dc2c48e5483d9db2aef30b569738f4b32.apk (package com.mydocs.documents). Both samples were used to compute the detection-rate figure above.

Each section below corresponds to one technique from the table above. Within each section we first quote the MITRE definition, then show the Quark behavior map extracted from the representative sample's bytecode, then walk through the call sequence and list the underlying rules.

1. T1430 Location Tracking

T1430 Location Tracking — attack.mitre.org

MITRE definition (T1430): Adversaries may track a device’s physical location through use of standard operating system APIs via malicious or exploited applications on the compromised device. On Android, applications holding the ACCESS_COAURSE_LOCATION [sic] or ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permissions provide access to the device’s physical location.

T1430 Location Tracking

In sample 3b66805144a14cb00bb58f41690e529c9e75b265faecbdb594c6c9f0f74892ed.apk (package com.ourselves.resort), LO00OOOOO/_;__ calls the Android API that returns the device's last known location.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

2. T1516 Input Injection

T1516 Input Injection — attack.mitre.org

MITRE definition (T1516): A malicious application can inject input to the user interface to mimic user interaction through the abuse of Android's accessibility APIs. Input Injection can be achieved using any of the following methods: Mimicking user clicks on the screen, for example to steal money…

T1516 Input Injection

In sample b14412435de7ebe13c434eef79a5c24dc2c48e5483d9db2aef30b569738f4b32.apk (package com.mydocs.documents), Lcom/mydocs/documents/Services/serviceMagic;onAccessibilityEvent calls four helper methods: Lcom/mydocs/documents/b/d;a, Lcom/mydocs/documents/b/d;b, Lcom/mydocs/documents/Services/serviceMagic;a and Lcom/mydocs/documents/Services/serviceMagic;b. Across these five methods, Quark matched the 5 rules listed below: they find accessibility nodes by view ID, get the root node of the active window, read a node's on-screen bounds, and perform accessibility actions on nodes. The map's call graph contains no other rule behavior.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

3. T1628.001 Suppress Application Icon

T1628.001 Suppress Application Icon — attack.mitre.org

MITRE definition (T1628.001): A malicious application could suppress its icon from being displayed to the user in the application launcher. This hides the fact that it is installed, and can make it more difficult for the user to uninstall the application. Hiding the application's icon programmatically does not require any special permissions.

T1628.001 Suppress Application Icon

In sample b14412435de7ebe13c434eef79a5c24dc2c48e5483d9db2aef30b569738f4b32.apk (package com.mydocs.documents), Lcom/mydocs/documents/b/f;h calls the API sequence that hides the current app's launcher icon.

Behaviors detected by Quark:

Coverage-gap notes

Existing rules do not detect this technique

  • T1417.001 Keylogging: 11 related rules; a map was built in package com.mydocs.documents, but it shows UI inspection and interaction through the accessibility service, not keystroke capture.
  • T1630.001 Uninstall Malicious Application: 18 related rules; a map was built in package com.mydocs.documents, but it shares the T1516 call graph and shows accessibility UI interaction only, with no sign of app removal.
  • T1426 System Information Discovery: 7 related rules; matched in 2 samples, but the rules only query the phone number, which is too narrow for this technique.
  • T1407 Download New Code at Runtime: 17 related rules; matched in 1 sample, but the rules show reflective class instantiation only, with no sign of downloading code.
  • T1437.001 Web Protocols: 14 related rules; matched in 2 samples, but the rules show generic HTTP/HTTPS connections only, with no sign of command-and-control use.
  • T1476 Deliver Malicious Application via Other Means: 8 related rules; rule hits in 2 samples show network data retrieval only, with no sign of app delivery or installation.
  • T1655.001 Match Legitimate Name or Location: 7 related rules; rule hits in 2 samples show package lookups only, with no sign of name matching.
    Rule hits only in third-party library code

These hits are excluded because every matched parent method is in third-party library or framework code, not in the app's own package. Such code reflects SDK behavior shared by any app that bundles the library, so it is not counted as behavior of this family.

  • T1418 Software Discovery: 1 related rule at full confidence; rule hits in 1 sample, all in library code.
  • T1406 Obfuscated Files or Information: 1 related rule at full confidence; rule hits in 1 sample, all in library code.
  • T1417.002 GUI Input Capture: 4 related rules at full confidence; rule hits in 1 sample, all in library code.
  • T1629.003 Disable or Modify Tools: 5 related rules at full confidence; rule hits in 1 sample, all in library code.

No related behavior detected (4) — T1582 SMS Control, T1636.003 Contact List, T1636.004 SMS Messages and T1633.001 System Checks. No related rule hit was recorded in either sample (T1633.001 has no Quark rule mapped to it), so no behavior map was formed for these techniques.

List of Tested APKs

The table below lists the APKs we tested.

index sha256
1 3B66805144A14CB00BB58F41690E529C9E75B265FAECBDB594C6C9F0F74892ED
2 B14412435DE7EBE13C434EEF79A5C24DC2C48E5483D9DB2AEF30B569738F4B32

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codecov Bot commented Oct 30, 2026 •

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Codecov Report

✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests.
✅ Project coverage is 81.28%. Comparing base (19ee61d) to head (5b70acf).

Additional details and impacted files
@@           Coverage Diff           @@
##           master     #986   +/-   ##
=======================================
  Coverage   81.28%   81.28%           
=======================================
  Files          84       84           
  Lines        7923     7923           
=======================================
  Hits         6440     6440           
  Misses       1483     1483           
Flag Coverage Δ
unittests 81.28% <ø> (ø)

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@haeter525 haeter525 left a comment

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Two questions about the coverage-gap notes.

1. T1516 is counted as confirmed but has no section. Please add one, and update "the 2 listed below" and "17" in the intro.

2. For T1426, T1417.002 and T1437.001: what's a per-sample check? If the rule has 100% confidence, they should appear in the behavior map.

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Two questions about the coverage-gap notes.

1. T1516 is counted as confirmed but has no section. Please add one, and update "the 2 listed below" and "17" in the intro.

2. For T1426, T1417.002 and T1437.001: what's a per-sample check? If the rule has 100% confidence, they should appear in the behavior map.

@haeter525 Thanks for the review — all addressed in 5b1c268:

1. T1516 section. Added a section for T1516 Input Injection (map, call walkthrough, 5 rules) and updated the intro to "3 were confirmed", "the 3 listed below" and "the other 16 techniques".

2. "Per-sample check" for T1426 / T1417.002 / T1437.001. Dropped that wording. 100% confidence alone doesn't produce a map here — the matched behavior must also pass a MITRE alignment check against the technique definition. T1426 (phone-number lookup only) and T1437.001 (generic HTTP only) failed that check, so no map was generated; they now sit under "Rules fired at full confidence, but the matched behavior did not match the technique definition". T1417.002 is a different case, see below.

Additional note. While revising, I also renamed "Rule hits, but no behavior-map cluster" to "Rule hits only in third-party library code" (T1417.002 is now here) and added a note explaining why these have no map: a map is only generated when at least one matched parent method is in the app's own package; hits whose parent methods are all in library/framework code are excluded, since they reflect SDK behavior shared by any app using that library rather than family-specific behavior.

The PR description is updated to match the file.

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LGTM. Thanks @aiden00713 !

@pulorsok
pulorsok merged commit 31b4b74 into ev-flow:master Nov 1, 2026
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