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Description
Parent: #2456 · Depends on: #2458, #2459
Delivery alignment (2026-11-09)
- Preserve the SS proof path alongside a versioned synchronized path. Initial runtime milestone: fixed designated T+1 set and one ciphertext; aggregator failover retains that set.
- Reuse compatible synchronized DKG/C6/C7/recursive/verifier implementation from the cryptographer's commit. Setup key provenance is tracked in Integrate synchronized DKG PRF-key material and proof provenance #2459; this issue owns the consuming C6/C7 relations and recursive/verifier integration.
- Port the PRF gadget to v0.6.0. The reference implementation's commitment-based
…/ctx-cmt,…/eval-x3transcript and three residues per squeezed field do not match v0.6.0's full native power-basis ciphertext…/ctx,…/evaltranscript and one residue per squeezed field. Require pinned Rust/Noir differential vectors rather than reusing the old gadget unchanged. - E3 authentication/domain binding remains an Interfold obligation, separate from the upstream PRF context. Fresh-noise and replay policy is owned with Integrate fixed-set single-ciphertext synchronized decryption runtime #2460; a range proof does not establish randomness or freshness.
- Keep every PR at 100 changed files or fewer, including generated artifacts. Follow-up designs: Design synchronized designated-set replacement and recovery #2462 and Design multiple synchronized ciphertext decryptions per E3 #2463.
Context
fhe.rs v0.6.0 provides trbfv partial decryption to the synchronized-decryptor construction in Colin de Verdière–Passelègue–Stehlé, ePrint 2026/031, §5. For a designated set S of threshold + 1 parties, with 1-based IDs, a party now produces
d_i^(S,ct) = λ_i^S · c1 · sh_i + e_i + r_i^(S,ct), where r_i = Σ_{j∈S,j≠i}(F_{k_i,j}(S,ct) − F_{k_j,i}(S,ct)).
Each party samples its own fresh smudging noise e_i; the masks cancel only for a complete set of shares for the same S and ct. Final decryption uses c0 + Σ_{i∈S} d_i, without applying Lagrange weights again. v0.6.0 implements the PRF using Poseidon2/SAFE; its PRF encoding and key layout must be the source of truth for circuit interoperability.
Interfold's current C6 instead proves d_i = c0 + c1·sh_i + e_sm,i using the C4 aggregated noise-share commitment. C7 then Lagrange-interpolates these shares. C1/C2b/C4b and the Rust witness/proof wiring still support shared smudging noise. Merely upgrading fhe.rs would leave the proofs checking a different decryption algorithm.
Circuit-side work
- Define a versioned proof/public-input contract for the synchronized mode. Bind each C6 share to the same designated set
S(canonical ordered IDs), ciphertext/level, E3 domain and party ID. Bind C7 to that exact context and to the corresponding C6 outputs; reject duplicate, out-of-range, unauthorized, missing or mixed-set/ciphertext shares. Preserve the C6→C7 share-commitment link. - Update C6's proven relation to
λ_i^S·c1·sh_i + e_i + r_i^(S,ct); keep the C4 secret-key commitment link, but do not accept an arbitrary uncommitted mask/noise witness. Constrain the local smudging noise to its signed integer bound and canonical RNS encoding, with parameter-compatible total noise. A circuit cannot prove randomness/freshness of local sampling alone: specify the host-side one-time/retry policy separately rather than claiming that range checks do so. - Specify and implement private PRF-key provenance and mask verification: authenticate each party's incoming/outgoing keys as the correctly paired committee keys established during setup, without exposing them; constrain Poseidon2/SAFE digest/evaluation, domain separation, key-to-field mapping, canonical
S, ciphertext coefficient order/level, output-to-CRT-residue reduction, and signed pairwise sums to match v0.6.0 byte/field-for-field. If setup currently lacks a sound key-binding mechanism, treat it as a prerequisite, not as an unconstrained C6 input. Assess constraint/proving costs before fixing the final design (the PRF emits a value per ciphertext coefficient and CRT limb). - Update C7 to sum exactly the committed C6 shares plus
c0once, then perform the existing CRT reconstruction and plaintext decoding; remove C7's Lagrange interpolation. Retire/version the C1→C2b→C4b shared-smudging commitment path for this mode without breaking in-flight E3s or historical proof formats. - Update Noir entry points, Rust witness generation (
crates/zk/witnessandcrates/zk/config), prover/commitment links and recursive/public-input layouts, parameter/codegen and configuration manifests, verifier keys/deployments and docs together. Wire proof requests to the sameS, ciphertext and PRF key material used by the host-sidefhe.rsimplementation. Do not reuse old C6/C7 VKs or silently mix protocol versions.
Acceptance criteria
- A valid end-to-end C6→C7 proof decrypts with v0.6.0-compatible witnesses on supported parameter/committee profiles. Initial integration uses one ciphertext and a fixed T+1 designated set; proposed selection is the lowest canonical T+1 IDs from the published H-roster, subject to protocol review. Circuit/PRF conformance vectors should still cover differing ciphertexts and canonical non-prefix sets; those vectors do not enable multiple outputs or runtime set replacement.
- Negative proofs fail for wrong/mixed
S, ciphertext or level, party/key pairing, tampered PRF transcript/output, out-of-bound smudging, arbitraryd_i, duplicate/missing shares and inconsistent C6→C7 commitments. Negative circuit tests ensure incomplete shares across sets cannot form a valid C7 proof. Runtime retries with a replacementSon the same ciphertext require the separate reviewed design in Design synchronized designated-set replacement and recovery #2462; multiple authorized decryptions per E3 require Design multiple synchronized ciphertext decryptions per E3 #2463. - Public-input/commitment links and generated VKs match the versioned circuit artifacts; measure gates/proving time for representative insecure and secure profiles and obtain a cryptographic review of the key-binding and PRF-in-circuit design before production rollout.
Related but distinct: C6 optimization #1947 concerns the existing circuit, not this protocol migration.
Activity
refactor(bfv): limit synchronized foundation to DKG
neogiacomo commentedon Nov 19, 2026
Review handoff: disabled Minimum decryption is now qualified at both degrees. Secure C6/C7/recursive were 8,609,254 / 1,516,802 / 2,242,265 gates; 26.68 GiB sampled peak with a 32 GiB stop guard. Native plaintext, both child VK pins, the outer bb proof, and generated Solidity verification were checked. Secure setup inputs were native; the signed DKG + actual registry + request-aware wrapper path was exercised on insecure Minimum. No secure registry route, deployment or runtime admission is claimed. Candidate manifests, reproduction and timings: #2530.
Merge order after independent approval: #2529 (CI selects and verifies an archive matching the checkout SS catalogue), #2524 (PRF), #2525 (C6), #2526 (C7), #2527 (recursive), #2528 (registry/context wrapper), #2530 (secure + manifests). Retarget child PRs to main in sequence; do not merge children into parent branches as a substitute for review. Each diff is below 100 files.
@YounesTal1: independent crypto/protocol review requested on the key pairing/openings, native PRF transcript, integer noise and quotient bounds, secure product evaluation challenge and exact recursive/request binding. This is a request for review, not a sign-off. #2460 retains ownership of live fixed-set retries/failover and host freshness; #2462/#2463 remain separate.